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1. Introduction
This paper analyzes the effect on investment levels of “cancelation 
rights,” which enable the government (client) to cancel projects before 
their completion, and of imposing necessary “financial constraints” on 
projects. The latter are discussed with respect to projects supplying 
public goods (and services) via a Private Finance Initiative (PFI). PFI is a 
privatized method of supplying public goods by obtaining private-sector 
funding and using private-sector technology and managerial knowhow.
Using PFI, the central government and local public entities have 
created a large social infrastructure.1  Over the decade from 2010 to 2020, 
the government aims to expand the scale of these undertakings to more 
than 12 trillion yen, primarily with such major projects as airports and 
sewage facilities. The government has established this as a growth area 
and has made numerous revisions to related statutes. It has incorporated 
“Opening Public Projects to the Private Sector and Promoting Public 
Projects Using Private Sector Funds” as Item 14 in its New Growth 
Strategy. 2 
However, the supply of public goods and services is believed to 
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be inadequate owing to differences in project contracts and funding 
methods. That is, because of cancelation rights based on project content 
and financial constraints based on whether the contractors have their 
own funding sources for the project or not. The government can exercise 
its right to cancel the project if the quality of the public goods appears 
unimproved with respect to the project contract specifications. Financial 
constraints are problematic when the contractors use internal funding 
that does not require repayment or when they use external funding 
from a financial institution that must be repaid. The presence or absence 
of cancelation rights and financial constraints is feared to indicate the 
failure to achieve optimal investment levels because projects would not 
be completed on time or loan contracts would set repayment schedules. 
In other words, these issues are caused by over-investment or of hold-
ups due to under-investment.
Existing research regarding investment in PFI projects includes 
Oshima (1999), whose study focuses on service transfer fees and the 
quality of public goods and discusses an incomplete contract model to 
conduct a quantitative comparison of the effect of the public project 
method and PFI on the volume of public goods supplied. Mitsui (2005) 
similarly focuses on the risks and information contained in both methods 
while Bennett and Iossa (2006) analyze the effect on investment levels 
depending on whether such public goods are owned by the government 
or the private sector.
However, while prior studies have analyzed investment levels, almost 
no analyses have been conducted from the perspective of financial 
constraints or cancelation rights. With future expansions in the PFI 
market, the government will be able to monitor financial constraints, 
which include whether a contractor is able to procure sufficient capital 
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or whether public goods are being supplied properly. Such monitoring 
may cause some contract cancelation issues. Furthermore, these factors 
are simultaneously believed to effect investment levels. Thus, analyzing 
financial constraints and cancelation rights will not merely identify the 
mechanisms involved but may also enable examination of whether they 
reach optimal investment levels or not. Thus, this paper is significant 
because it goes beyond merely studying existing PFI methods.
Section 2 explains the model, Section 3 contemplates a first best 
solution and Section 4 provides a detailed analysis of both financial 
constraints and cancelation rights; finally, Section 5 presents our 
conclusions.
2. The Model 
The multi-period model employed in this study runs from Date0 to 
Date4.3 The players are the government, the special purpose companies 
(SPC) supplying public goods, and the financial institutions providing 
financing. Each player is risk neutral.4  While the government aims 
to maximize social welfare, the other players aim to maximize their 
expected returns. Moreover, the market interest rate and rate of time 
preference are both zero.
3 The model used in this paper is based on Edlin, A.S. and Reichelstein, S. (1996), 
Seshimo, H. (2003), and Sato and Hosoe (2003).
4 Players providing financing are not necessarily financial institutions. Players having 
investment capital can also include SPC’ investment arms and group companies, 
trading companies, and general contractors.
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Figure 1 represents this model’s timeline.
We analyze two cases of financial constraints: when SPC have financial 
constraints on receiving funding from financial institutions and when 
they do not. In case of financial constraints being imposed, a financial 
institution provides funding to the SPC on Date0 for production costs 
k incurred during the production of public goods and enters into a 
loan contract {k' R} to repay amount R by Date3. A third party verifies 
the loan contract. With no funds remaining at the SPC, k is invested 
for the production of public goods on Date2. The government and the 
SPC enter into a project contract on Date1. If the contract term can be 
verified as not having cancelation rights, then an executable contract 
{s,t} will be concluded that establishes the contract term t and includes 
service transfer fees s to be paid by the government to the SPC for the 
produced public goods. Service transfer fees s are only incurred from 
Date3 to Date4 and not from Date1 to Date3. The conversion value 
of an alternative investment opportunity for the SPC is denoted by 
the exogenous variable v. On Date2, the SPC makes a related special 
investment in the specific PFI project, the cost of which is i. Between 
Date3 and Date4, the SPC’s utility S increases. S is made up of u, which 
is a function of i and is concave, as expressed by u' ( i)>0, u''( i)<0. Here, 
both i and u(i) are unverifiable. On Date3, the unverifiable conversion 
value v∈[v min,vmax ] appears in probability distribution F, thus leading to 
a renegotiation of the project contract. However, F''≤0. At this point, the 
SPC generates revenue and the loan is due. If the SPC fails to repay the 
contracted amount, ownership of the remaining facilities is transferred to 
the financial institution.
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3. First Best
Let us determine the first best solution, which is the investment 
that maximizes the players’ joint profits. This is the conversion value’s 
distribution F(v) and therefore joint profit G(i) can be found using the 
following equation:
G(i)≡∫ max[u(i),v]dF(v) - i
Mutual gain is defined as the difference between the larger of either 
utility or conversion value from the supply of public goods dependent on 
investment levels, and expected gain with investment costs deducted. 
This gives us the following:
G(i)=∫
u(i)
u(i)dF(v) +∫u(i)vdF(v) - i
The first best solution is the one that maximizes this equation. Thus, 
if we assume an interior solution, the first best solution satisfies the 
following first-order condition:
 G '(i)=F [u(i FB )]u'(i FB ) - 1=0             　　       (1)
As the conversion value is independent of investment level, the 
optimal investment level u(i) - i is smaller than the maximum i. The 
following discussion considers this as the benchmark.
4. Second Best
4.1. The Case of No Financial Constraints
Let us analyze three cases with no financial constraints. In 4.1.1, 
the contract has cancelation rights, the one in 4.1.2 does not, and the 
one in 4.1.3 has cancelation rights that are applicable after a project is 
completed but before the contract term ends.
4.1.1. A Contract with Cancellation Rights
When the contract contains cancelation rights, the government can 
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nullify the project contract with an SPC on Date3 and thus exercise 
cancelation rights if the conversion value is greater than the expected 
return from the public goods. This is possible because neither party 
made this a point of agreement when renegotiating the contract. On the 
other hand, if the conversion value is less than the expected return from 
the public goods, the government will establish service transfer fees with 
the SPC during the renegotiations. Therefore, if the SPC’s negotiating 
power is assumed to be β∈(0,1), the SPC’s expected return is as follows:
{  0                     if v≥u(i)                    β [u(i)+s]     if  v<u(i)                            　 (2)
Thus, in this case, even though a conversion value occurs when 
v≥u(i), the government will pay 0 because this is not a service transfer 
fee accompanying public goods supply. On the other hand, if v<u(i), the 
government will renegotiate rather than exercise its cancelation rights. 
The SPC’s threat point is v while the government’s threat point is 0, 
thus the negotiating range is u(i) - v. This is distributed according to the 
proportion of negotiating power.
At Date2 in Equation (2), the SPC’s expected return is decided to be 
maximized as follows:
S (i ) =∫
u(i)
β [u (i ) - v ]d F (v ) - i 　　　    　　　　　　 (3)
The first-order condition for maximizing Equation (3) is that the 
investment level should satisfy Equation (4):
β F [u (i C )]u '(i C ) = 1　         　　　　    　　 (4)
We therefore propose the following lemma.
Lemma 1. (Hold-up Problem)
In case the contract imposes no financial constraints on an SPC and 
gives it no cancelation rights, the related specific investment becomes an 
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under-investment.
Proof: Based on Equations (1) and (4), βF [u(i C )]u '(i C )<1 and i C <i FB are true. 
QED.
4.1.2. A Contract without Cancelation Rights
When the contract does not contain cancelation rights, the SPC can 
execute the project contract even if negotiations fail; therefore, the 
SPC’s threat point is  u(i) + s while that of the government is the service 
transfer fee. The SPC’s returns on Date3 following negotiations are as 
follows:                       
{u(i) + s + β{v - [u(i) + s]}             if   v≥u(i)  u(i) + s + β{u(i) - [u(i) + s]+s}      if   v<u(i) 
In case v≥u(i), the government would want to nullify the project 
contract with the SPC but cannot do so because it has no cancelation 
rights.
The government will simultaneously increase social welfare by not 
renegotiating the initial contract with the SPC.
In summary, 
{(1 - β)[u(i) + s]+βv       if  v≥u(i)   u(i) + s            　      if  v<u(i).
Based on the above, the SPC will decide to maximize its expected 
return as follows:
 S(i)=∫
u(i)
[u(i) + s]dF(v) +∫u(i){(1 - β)[u(i ) + s] + βv}dF(v) - i     (5)
The first-order condition for maximizing Equation (5) is determined as 
the investment level required to satisfy the following equation:
{F [u(i NC )]+(1 - β)[1 - F [u(i NC )]}u'(i NC ) = 1                      (6)
We therefore propose the following lemma.
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Lemma 2. (Under-investment)
If the SPC has no financial constraints and no cancelation rights in its 
contract, the relation-specific investment will be an over-investment.
Proof: Based on Equations (1) and (6), {F [u(i FB )] + (1 - β)[1 - F(u(i FB )]} u' 
(i FB )>1 and i NC>i FB are true. QED.
4.1.3. Cancelation Rights During the Term of the Project Contract
Let us consider the case where a project contract is concluded on 
Date1 and the government and the SPC renegotiate the contract on 
Date3. During period t , while the contract is in force, the SPC makes 
the investment and earns service transfer fees. Meanwhile, after period 
t  following Date3, the government has the right to cancel the project 
contract with the SPC. The SPC’s return for the contract period is the 
same as in 4.1.2, as follows:
{(1 - β )[u(i) + s]+βv       if  v≥u(i)  u(i) + s            　      if  v<u(i)
After Date3 and the end of period t , the project is completed and 
renegotiation begins. The return 1 - t  during the remaining term of the 
contract is equivalent to the SPC’s expected return in 4.1.1, the case with 
cancelation rights, as follows:
{0                       if  v≥u(i)      β [u(i) + s ]           if  v<u(i)
Based on these, the SPC decides to maximize 
 S(i) = t{∫
u(i)
[u(i) + s]dF(v) +∫u(i)[(1 - β)(u(i ) + s) + βv]dF(v) }  
+ (1 - t ){∫
u(i))
β[u(i) + s]}dF(v) - i 
as it is the expected return. The first-order condition for maximization 
is identified to be the investment level required to satisfy the following 
equation:
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{[β+(1 - β )t]F(u(i )) + (1 - β )t[1 - F (u(i ))]} u'(i)  = 1
Based on the above, we propose the following theorem.
Theorem 1.
When the SPC has no financial constraints and can enter into a project 
contract that continues from Date1, considering that t* is the project 
term, then the first best relation-specific investment can be achieved. 
Herein, t* indicates t* ≡F [u(i FB )]. The government and the SPC enter 
into a project contract that fulfills these conditions.
Proof: Considering t = t* , the first-order condition for maximization is 
{βF [u(i )] + (1 - β )F [u(i )]} u'(i) = 1. i  = i FB meets this condition. Therefore, 
the SPC invests  i FB. Furthermore, the government and the SPC establish 
a contract term on Date1 that maximizes the sum of both player’s 
returns, which is equivalent to the joint return and independent of the 
contract term. Thus, the contract is concluded at t = t FB, where the joint 
return is maximized. QED.
4.2. The Case with Financial Constraints
Here, we consider cases in which the SPC has financial constraints. In 
4.2.1, the contract contains cancelation rights while in 4.2.2, it does not.
4.2.1. Loan Contract with Cancellation Rights
When the contract includes cancelation rights, the government can 
cancel the project contract with the SPC during renegotiations on Date3.
When the conversion value is realized on Date3, the SPC’s return can 
be expressed as follows:
SC(v) = v + ( 1 - β ) max [u(i) - v' 0 ]
The second term on the right shows the expected return, which is 
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calculated as a proportion of the negotiating power during renegotiations 
when the conversion value is the SPC’s threat point. Figure 2 illustrates 
SC(v).
Figure 2. SPC’s Return after Realizing v
When SC(v) < R , the SPC invests in an alternative investment 
opportunity rather than in the PFI project. This is SC(  ̂v)  = R,where  ̂v is 
the conversion value at which both players are indifferent to investment 
opportunities. In particular, this is expressed as follows:
{  ̂v = ̂ ¯v (R )         if  v≥u(i)   ̂ v = ̂ 
¯
v  (R
'
 i )     if  v<u(i)
Here, ̂ ¯v (R ) and ̂ 
¯
v (  ̂v ) (R
' 
i ) are as follows:
                                  ̂ ¯v (R ) ≡R
                                 ̂ 
¯
v  (R
' 
i )≡
If the amount owed as of Date0 is sufficiently large, at (R≥u(i )), where 
R - (1 - β )u(i )
β
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v < ̂ ¯v (R )≡R , the SPC will invest in an alternative investment opportunity 
instead of the PFI project. In other words, if the SPC’s negotiating power 
with the financial institution is γ ∈(0
'
 1), the SPC’s expected return on 
Date2 is as follows:
S (i ) =∫
u(i)
γ [u (i ) - v ]d F (v )
Thus, the first-order condition of maximization is 
γF [u (i )]u'(i) = 1
indicating an under-investment of iC<iFB. Furthermore, iC is independent 
of the repayment amount because this amount is large enough for 
the SPC to decide whether it needs to be invested in an alternative 
investment opportunity, regardless of its utility for the SPC.
To summarize, when the repayment amount is sufficiently large, 
even though the conversion value is less than u ( i ), the SPC cancels 
the PFI project and the player with which the government continues 
negotiations is usually a financial institution. When the conversion value 
exceeds u (i ), the SPC will not enter into a contract with the government 
for the PFI project as long as the difference between the expected 
return from other investment opportunities and that from the PFI 
project is positive. Moreover, when the SPC negotiates with the financial 
institution, the latter takes a 1 - γ  percentage of the difference between 
the return from the PFI project and the conversion value. Thus, the SPC 
will under-invest.
Next, let us analyze the case in which the repayment amount agreed 
to on Date0 is sufficiently small, at (R < u (i )). In such a case, the SPC will 
cancel the project if its investment is v <  ̂  
¯
v (R
'
 i ). The government, which 
strives to maximize social welfare, will cancel the contract; thus, the 
SPC’s expected return will be as follows:
S (i ) = ∫ 
̂ 
¯
v
 
(R 、i )
γ [u (i ) - v ]d F (v ) + ∫  　β [u (i ) - v ]d F (v ) - i    (7)
 
̂ 
¯
v
 
(R 、i )
u(i)
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Investment levels are decided such that the first-order condition for 
maximization satisfies the following equation:
{βF [u(i C)] + (γ - β )F [  ̂
¯
v (R
'
i C)] +               F '[  ̂
¯
v (R
'
i C)][R  - u(i C)]} u'(i C) (8)
To summarize, an under-investment occurs when β > γ , thus making 
it desirable to make R as small as possible. If the minimum repayment 
amount is small enough, the investment level will be the same as in 
the case without financial constraints because, given Equation (8), the 
following is true:
βF [u(i 
C
)] u'(i 
C
)  = 1
Thus, the first-order condition is the same as the case without financial 
constraints.
On the other hand, under-investment occurs when β ≤ γ . In this case, 
it is optimal that R = u(i 
C
) and investment level is the same as in the case 
where R > u(i ) because if  R = u(i 
C
)  in Equation (8), then
γF [u(i 
C
)] u'(i 
C
)  = 1.
Thus, the first-order condition is the same as in the case where  R >u(i ).
Theorem 2.
When the SPC has a contract with financial constraints and cancelation 
rights, it will under-invest. However, this will also depend on the SPC’s 
negotiating power vis-a-vis the government and the financial institution; 
therefore, the optimal service transfer fee will be as follows:
{R < βv
min + (1 - β )u(i 
C
)      if  β > γ
  R ≥ u(i 
C
)                        if  β ≤ γ
4.2.2. Loan Contracts in Cases without Cancelation Rights
Let us now consider the project during the period from Date3 to 
Date4 in a case without cancelation rights and having the efficiency of 
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an investment protected by a loan contract.
The SPC’s return on Date3 after negotiations with the government is 
as follows:
{(1 - β )[u(i ) + s ] + βv        if  v  ≥ u(i )                                    u(i ) + s                              if  v < u(i)
On the other hand, when the project contractor transfers from 
the SPC to the financial institution, the SPC’s expected return after 
negotiations in a case without cancelation rights is as follows:
{0                            if  v  ≥ u(i )                                           γ[u(i ) + s ]         if  v < u(i)
If other investment opportunities exceed the amount to be invested 
in the PFI project, the government and the SPC will renegotiate. This is 
shown as S PC (v ) in Figure 3.
When R ≤ s, the SPC will never cancel the PFI project contract and in 
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such a case, an over-investment will occur, as in 4.1.2. We will therefore 
examine the case where R > s.
When no difference exists between canceling the PFI project contract 
and repaying the amount lent by the financial institution, that is, when v 
is   ̂v , the following is satisfied:
S PC(  ̂v ) = R
Solving this equation results in
  ̂v(R , i ; s)≡       + u(i ).
According to the definition of   ̂v, when v <  ̂v (R , i : s ), the SPC will cancel 
the project contract. Foreseeing this, the SPC’s expected return on Date2 
is as follows:
S PC(i ) = ∫
u(i)
γ [u (i ) - s ]d F (v ) + ∫       {(1 - β )[ u(i ) + s ]  + βv}d F (v ) - i
The investment level is established so that the first-order condition for 
maximization satisfies the following:
{γF [u (i )] + (1 -β ){1 -F [ ̂ v( R , i ; s)]}-{    +u (i )}F ' [ ̂ v( R , i ; s)]}u'(i ) = 1  (9)
Theorem 3.
If the contract has financial constraints but no cancelation rights, and if 
( 1 - γ )F [u(i FB )] + (1 - β){1 - F [u(i FB )]} + [ s - u(i FB )]F ' [u(i FB )] ≥ 0,   (10)
the repayment amount is at the first best investment level.
Proof: Assuming that R = R max ≡ s  +(1 - β )[v
max - u(i FB )], because  ̂v = 
v max, Equation (9) will be γF [u(i FB )]u'(i FB ) < 1. This indicates an under-
investment.
Next, when R ≡ s  + ε  (ε → + 0), then  ̂v → u( i ), and the first-order 
condition that satisfies the maximization of investment levels is as follows:
{γF [u (i )] + (1 - β ){1 - F [u(i )]} + [ s - u( i )]F ' [u(i )]}u'(i ) = 1
Based on this condition, we can observe that an over-investment occurs 
in the case of Equation (10). Furthermore, based on the maximization 
 ̂ v( R , i ; s)
βR + s
1 - β
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theorem, investment continues with regard to R . Continuing to move 
R can steer under-investments and over-investments, and therefore, a 
repayment amount exists that will result in a first best solution based on 
an intermediate-value theorem. QED.
As in 4.1.2, over-investment occurs when the SPC has no financial 
constraints. Financial constraints lower investment levels. As such, a 
loan contract coordinating investment levels under the conditions of 
Equation (10) will lead to a first best solution. If Equation (10) is rejected, 
investment levels will change discontinuously under R = s , and an 
optimal investment level will not be observed. If we assume R ≤ s , the 
SPC will never exercise cancelation rights and over-investment will 
occur. On the other hand, if we assume that R > s , the contract will be 
canceled and an under-investment will occur.
From Equation (10), and when v max and u(i FB ) are sufficiently small, 
over-investments can be controlled, thus resulting in a first best solution. 
Moreover, the larger the negotiating power, or the smaller β , the more 
likely that Equation (10) will achieve a first best solution.
5. Conclusion
This paper compared PFI projects with other investment opportunities 
to examine the influence of SPC financial constraints and cancelation 
rights on PFI project investment levels.
The primary conclusions are as follows. When SPC have no financial 
constraints, they under-invest in cases with cancelation rights and over-
invest in cases without cancelation rights. Moreover, optimal investment 
levels can be reached when entering into a contract for a continuing 
project. When financial constraints exist, SPC will under-invest when 
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the contract has cancelation rights. Moreover, SPC may decide not 
to enter into PFI project contracts owing to their expected returns 
from alternative investment opportunities. If we assume that financial 
institutions participate in the negotiations to facilitate the signing of a 
contract, some of the expected returns will be transferred to the financial 
institution, and the project will be delayed due to under-investment. 
Nevertheless, we found that optimal investment levels can be achieved 
under certain conditions.
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